Financial markets create trading opportunities affecting the incentives to reveal the private information essential to financial intermediaries in the efficient provision of liquidity insurance. Financial markets and financial intermediaries may be competing mechanisms in the provision of liquidity insurance, and their co-existence impacts risk-sharing, as noted earlier by Jacklin The optimal policy response by the central bank is a simple portfolio restriction in the form of a liquidity floor, which creates a wedge between the endogenous marginal rate of transformation and the interbank lending rate. Implementation of the optimal policy requires the co-existence of intermediation and financial markets. Even if the central bank could prevent trading demand deposit contracts in financial markets, it is not optimal to do so. The issues studied here might arise, for example, in a banking union with a common central bank or a large country with regional liquidity shocks.
The role of the central bank in facilitating risk-sharing across heterogeneous regions is studied in a model with private information and private trading. Liquidity preference shocks create a demand for liquidity, as in Diamond and Dybvig [4] . Regions are ex ante identical and become differentiated by a liquidity shock determining the fraction of early and late consumers. The liquidity preference shock is observed only by the household and the regional liquidity demand shock is known only to the financial intermediary in the region.
Financial markets and financial intermediaries may be competing mechanisms in the provision of liquidity insurance, and their co-existence impacts risk-sharing, as noted earlier by Jacklin [13] , Diamond [8] , Allen and Gale [2] , among others. Households can insure against the liquidity preference shock through deposits with the local financial intermediary or else by directly trading in financial markets. The question studied here is what is the optimal central bank policy when there are liquidity preference shocks and regional liquidity demand shocks in the presence of private information and private trading.
Using a Diamond-Dybvig model, Jacklin [13] describes how private trading opportunities can severely limit risk sharing. The implication of private trading opportunities for agents' decisions is studied by Farhi, Golosov and Tsyvinski [9] (FGT) in a Diamond-Dybvig banking model. Optimal central bank policy in a Diamond-Dybvig type model with regional liquidity shocks is studied by Bhattacharya and Gale [4] , who derive an incentive efficient allocation. The model here differs from previous work in several ways. FGT use a single region Diamond-Dybvig model in which the return to the long-term investment is exogenous, as is the fraction of patient and impatient agents. Bhattacharya and Gale focus on optimal central bank policy across regions using a model with deterministic returns to investment in which private trading arrangements are prohibited. In contrast, the model presented here has an endogenous return to the long term asset and the focus is on the co-existence of intermediation and financial markets as insurance mechanisms. Regions differ in terms of the fraction of patient and impatient agents and this fraction is random and privately observed.
When the central bank can restrict private trading, it can implement an allocation over time that is incentive efficient, by acting as a mechanism designer. There are two constraints for the allocation to be incentive efficient: (i) the region cannot engage in any further borrowing or lending in an interbank market and (ii) households cannot engage in any private trading arrangements such as a financial market trading negotiable demand deposit contracts. There may be an incentive to engage in additional trading because of differences in the discounted present value of an allocation across regions and differences in the discounted present value of the allocation provided by a financial intermediary to patient and impatient households.
When interbank borrowing and lending cannot be prevented and households do not directly participate in financial markets, the resulting competitive equilibrium is inefficient. The competitive equilibrium is inefficient when financial markets and intermediation co-exist, even if financial intermediaries eliminate arbitrage profit opportunities resulting in an integrated credit markets. The optimal central bank policy is to impose a liquidity floor, as in Farhi, Golosov and Tsyvinski, and to continue to allow trading of deposit contracts in financial markets.
Basic Model
There are three periods t = 0, 1, 2 and a continuum of locations φ ∈ Φ ≡ [0, 1]. There is a representative financial intermediary and a continuum of households at each location.
2 At t = 0, each household at location φ is endowed with E units of the consumption good, which is deposited with the financial intermediary at location φ. The financial intermediary invests a portion of this deposit E − k in a short-term project, where one unit invested at t = 0 yields one unit of consumption at t = 1, and the remainder k (capital) is invested in a long-term project yielding output at t = 2. The long-term project cannot be interrupted at t = 1. An investment of k at t = 0 yields θk α at t = 2, where 0 < α < 1 and 0 < θ < ∞. Storage is available between periods 1 and 2, with one unit stored at t = 1 yielding one unit at t = 2.
Households and Liquidity Demand
A household cares about consumption in periods t = 1, 2. At t = 1, each household observes a liquidity preference shock υ ∈ {0, 1}. A household has a utility function U : + → taking the form
where 0 < β < 1. A household realizing υ = 0 wishes to consume only in the first period (impatient), while households realizing υ = 1 are indifferent between first and second period consumption (patient). The realization υ is private information for the household.
2 One may instead assume there is a representative household at each location in which consumption is perfectly divisible across members of the household over time.
Assumption 1 (i) U is continuously twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave; (ii) U satisfies the Inada conditions; (iii) U (c)c is non-increasing.
The assumption U (c)c is non-increasing provides a motive for liquidity insurance, as is standard in the Diamond and Dybvig model. This assumption corresponds to Assumption 1 in Green and Lin [].
A region experiences an idiosyncratic liquidity demand shock h, where h ∈ H ≡ [h,h] ⊂ (0, 1) denotes the fraction of impatient agents h (agents realizing υ = 0) and 1 − h is the fraction of patient agents (agents realizing υ = 1). For each region φ ∈ Φ, h is a random variable that is independent and identically distributed across regions. Let 0 < π(h) < 1 denote the probability of realizing h and define the mean
A region is said to have a high demand for liquidity when h > h m and a low demand when h < h m . The realization h in φ is private information observed only by the financial intermediaries in region φ.
Denote c t : {0, 1} × H → R + , t ∈ {1, 2} as the period t consumption of a household realizing υ residing in a region realizing h.
Let Λ denote the set of feasible allocations. At t = 0, the representative household at location φ has expected
The incentive compatibility constraints are
If c 2 (0, h) = 0, impatient agents receive nothing in the second period, and later will be shown to be optimal.
In this case, (4) is never binding and the individual incentive compatibility constraints reduce to
Patient agents can always announce they are impatient and store the consumption good, while impatient agents have no incentive to announce they are patient.
Households realizing υ = 0 prefer to have some insurance against early consumption and this insurance is typically provided by the regional financial intermediary. The random liquidity demand shock h impacts the financial intermediary's ability to provide this liquidity insurance. This shock can be partially smoothed by borrowing and lending when there is an interbank market. The central bank may be able to improve on the risk sharing by acting as a mechanism designer.
Regions and Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries from different regions can borrow or lend in an interbank credit market at rate r,
where they act as price takers. Within a region, there is competition among identical financial intermediaries and there may be a local financial market with interest rate r(h), where the representative financial intermediary and local households are the only participants in the local market. Only financial intermediaries are able to participate in the interbank credit market. 3 An overview of the model in in Figure ( To facilitate credit flows (i), the financial intermediary borrows or lends in the interbank market to smooth liquidity demand shocks. If the interbank rate r is different from the local financial market rate r(h), then the financial intermediary will arbitrage across markets. Cocco et al [5] provide empirical evidence on the importance of the interbank market as a distributor of liquidity. For (ii), financial intermediaries provide loans to producers of the long-term project. There is an extensive literature on the role of a financial intermediary as a delegated monitor in mitigating the impact of asymmetric information; see the discussion in Diamond [7] for example. To simplify the model, I assume the financial intermediary manages the longterm project in lieu of introducing an additional set of agents, although this can be easily modified. 4 In the provision of liquidity insurance (iii), the financial intermediary offers insurance when it provides higher
Interbank Market r
Local fi nanci al market r(h) Households can trade with the local financial intermediary and the local financial market at interest rate r(h). A financial intermediary trades with intermediaries in other regions in the interbank market at interest rate r. Locationφ has a fractionĥ of impatient households while location φ has a fraction h.
consumption to a household wishing to consume early than the household could achieve by borrowing against or selling its claims on the long-term project in a financial market.
The following assumption is made to ensure the concept of a region is well-defined.
Assumption 2 (i) Households in region φ ∈ Φ cannot trade directly with households in regionφ ∈ Φ, φ =φ; (ii) Households are prevented from participating directly in the interbank market; (iii) Only financial intermediaries in region φ can participate in the local credit market in φ.
These are extreme assumptions used to make precise the concept of a region. Financial innovation and advances in communication technology have blurred the concept of a regional financial intermediary. There is no difficulty, for example, in allowing the financial intermediaries in different regions to be owned by the same holding company. The assumption only large agents can participate in wholesale financial markets is used in Allen, Gale and Carletti [1] , Allen and Gale [2] , and succinctly described by Kiyotaki [14] .
The financial arrangement between the local representative financial intermediary and local households is assumed to take one of two forms: households trade only with the local financial intermediary, or else there are co-existing local financial markets and financial intermediation. The main issue studied here is how the co-existence of the local and regional financial markets impacts the efficiency of the equilibrium allocations.
Observable Liquidity Demand Shocks
The model is first solved under the assumption the realizations (h, υ) are publicly observable. This provides a benchmark for comparison with the private information economy. It also explains the impact of assuming an endogenous return to the long-term asset when there is private information, unlike the standard DiamondDybvig [6] model where the return to the long-term asset is exogenous. Since θαk α−1 < 1 is a possibility, the social planner may chose to store between periods 1 and 2, where storage in region h is denoted s(h) = (1 − h)c 1 (1, h). The social planner maximizes the expected utility of a representative household in a representative region (3) by choosing {k, c 1 (0, h), c 2 (1, h), s(h)}, subject to the resource constraint for each period
and the constraint s(h) ≥ 0 for all h. Since all regions are identical at t = 0, there is no incentive to shift resources across regions. After the distribution of the idiosyncratic liquidity demand shock h is realized at t = 1, the social planner may choose to store or transfer resources across regions.
Since c 2 (0, h) does not enter the objective function, it is optimal to set c 2 (0, h) = 0. The first-order conditions simplify to a system
where (10) holds with equality only if s(h) > 0. 5 It follows from the first-order conditions that (c
are invariant with respect to h; let c 1 = c 1 (0, h) and
, then for (9) and (10) to hold simultaneously requires r = θαk α−1 = 1, in which case investment in the long-term project satis-
This is the maximum investment in the long-term project and any additional resources transferred from the first to the second period will be made through storage. For convenience, denote total storage as
For positive storage to be an equilibrium, (9)-(10) imply S solves
The left side is increasing in S while the right side is decreasing, so a unique solution exists. Since 0 < β < 1 5 The full problem is stated here. Let λt denote the Lagrangian multiplier for the resource constraint at period t. Let λs(h) denote the multiplier for the non-negativity of storage s(h). The first-order conditions with respect to {k,
The invariance of c 1 (0, h), c 2 (1, h) with respect to h follows from (12) and (13) . Use (11)- (13) to eliminate the multipliers. Use
Eliminating the multipliers results in equations (9)- (10).
and U is strictly concave, it follows
or equivalently
Since S ≥ 0, there will be no storage at c 1 = c 2 if
The issue is to ensure the production possibility frontier has a marginal rate of transformation exceeding unity at the point where it intersects the 45-degree line, and the following assumption provides that property.
Assumption 3 Let
(θα)
The implications of this assumption are explained in Figure ( 2), which graphs the production possibility frontier for the economy between periods t = 1 and t = 2. The horizontal axis is consumption of the representative impatient agent and the vertical axis is consumption of the representative patient agent.
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There is storage when θαk α−1 < 1, which is indicated by the line segment connecting the point (
Substitute the resource constraints into (9) to obtain an equation in the unknown k
The left side is strictly increasing in k while the right side is strictly decreasing so a unique solution exists under the conditions of Assumption 1; let k f denote this solution. The solution k f is decreasing in h m , but otherwise does not depend on the distribution π(·) of h. Define
The production possibility frontier without storage is
The slope is
and r f = θαk 
Liquidity Preference Shocks are Unobservable
The household's liquidity preference realization υ and its consumption are now assumed to be private information known only to the household. The liquidity demand shock h remains publicly observable and there are no regional (local) credit markets. The individual incentive compatibility constraints (6) must hold to induce truth-telling. The first-best solution {k f , c f 1 , c f 2 } is derived assuming υ is publicly observable, so the incentive-compatibility constraint (6) may not be satisfied. Assumption (2) Suppose βr f = βθαk α−1 = 1 and define k i = (βθα)
Assumption 4 ensures there is an allocation along the production possibility frontier above the 45 degree line with βr ≥ 1.
To see this, use the properties βr f ≥ 1 (or c f 2 ≥ c f 1 ) and U (c)c is decreasing, and the first-order condition
Decentralization
A contingent claims market is briefly described, after which the link with interbank lending is discussed. The liquidity demand shock h is observable, but a household's υ and consumption are not. The representative financial intermediary in a region trades in a contingent claims market at t = 0 to insure against liquidity demand shocks. One unit of consumption delivered at t ∈ {1, 2} contingent on realizing h can be purchased at price p t (h). The t = 0 budget constraint in the contingent claims market is
The representative financial intermediary maximizes expected utility (3) subject to the contingent claims constraint (18) and
Consumption is related to contingent-claims purchases according to The equilibrium contingent claims prices satisfy
The contingent claim purchases at t = 0 create a sequence of state-contingent transfers across regions over periods t = 1, 2. Hence the first best allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with contingent claims when h is observable and υ is private information. If an interbank market opens at t = 1, there will be no borrowing or lending when the interest rate is r f .
The contingent claims market is equivalent to deposit insurance, which is defined as a set of mandatory
Since, in general,
interbank lending and borrowing is not a replacement for contingent claims trading or deposit insurance.
Logarithmic Example
When utility is logarithmic, the optimal investment in the long-term project is k f = B(h m )E, where B :
The function B(·) is decreasing and convex. 8 The equilibrium real rate of interest satisfies r f = θαk
Financial Intermediation versus Financial Markets
Each region φ realizes a liquidity demand shock h at t = 1 that is not observed by any one outside of region φ. The household's liquidity preference shock υ and consumption are observed only by the household. Since h is private information, a contingent-claims market to insure the liquidity demand shock at t = 0 will not
exist. In this section, there is no central bank implementing transfers across regions. Two mechanisms for insuring against the liquidity shocks -financial intermediation and financial markets -will be compared.
There is an interbank market in both cases and the difference is whether households have access to both financial intermediaries and the local financial market or just financial intermediaries.
Financial Intermediaries and Interbank Credit
By assumption, there is no local financial market for households, so any liquidity insurance is provided by the local financial intermediary. This implies the local financial markets do not exist in Figure 1 . In the standard Diamond-Dybvig model, the demand deposit contract implements the first-best allocation, but also creates a run equilibrium, which is a potential issue here. Although the long-term project cannot be liquidated, it is possible for the financial intermediary to borrow in the interbank market and the debt repayment may induce patient agents to run on the intermediary. Green and Lin [11] eliminate the bank run equilibrium by expanding the set of admissible financial arrangements over those considered by Diamond and Dybvig, demonstrating an incentive-efficient allocation can be implemented in a model without sequential service by linking the allocation to the reported messages of all agents. Although liquidity demand is random in this model, the consumption allocations can be made contingent on the fraction of agents reporting υ = 0. If the individual incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied, agents will truthfully reveal their types, so a Green and Lin allocation can be implemented. The financial intermediary's problem is first described, after which the Green-Lin mechanism is dicussed.
The financial intermediary determines its portfolio {E − k, θk α } at time t = 0. Since h is unobservable, there is no contingent claims trading. At t = 1, it observes h, which is private information. It It has access to the interbank market where it can borrow or lend the amount A at interest rate r. Its financial constraints in periods t = 1, 2 are
Solve (23) for A and substitute into (22) and rewrite
Define
and let W = W (r, k). Given {W, r, h)}, the financial intermediary chooses {c 1 (υ, h), c 2 (υ, h)} to solve
subject to
The solution (c
If βr ≥ 1, then the individual incentive compatibility constraint (6) is satisfied. To determine if βr ≥ 1 requires construction of the equilibrium, which is addressed below.
In the Green and Lin mechanism, the financial intermediary determines the allocations based on the fraction of households reporting they are impatient; let m denote this fraction. The financial intermediary chooses an allocation {c 1 (υ, m), c 2 (υ, m)} depending on the report m, where this allocation satisfies Under the conditions of Theorem 1, the truth-telling equilibrium is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of 9 The dual to this problem is studied in Farhi, Golosov and Tsyvinski, and is equivalent to this specification. 10 If βr = 1, then the patient household is indifferent between receiving its allocation at t = 1 or t = 2. For convenience, set 
The right side is strictly increasing in c 1 , hence a unique solution exists; denote the solution x 1 (h, r) and define
The functions {x 1 (h, r), x 2 (h, r)} have the following properties:
The functions x 1 (h, r) and x 2 (h, r) are continuous in (h, r) and nonincreasing in h.
(ii) The fraction of wealth devoted to impatient households hx 1 (h, r) is increasing in h and the fraction devoted to patient households (1 − h)x 2 (h, r) is decreasing in h.
(iii) The impact of an increase in r on x 1 (r, h) depends on h, specifically whether the region is a borrower or a lender. There exists an h b (r) such that
, so the region is neither a borrower or a lender.
There exists an h c ∈ H such that, if h ≥ h c , x 1 (h, r) is nonincreasing in r.
The proof is in the appendix. Hence, when h is high, consumption falls in both periods and a greater fraction of wealth is devoted to early consumers.
The idiosyncratic risk in the liquidity demand shock cannot be diversified away. (1−h)βU (x2) , so for all regions r = U (x1) βU (x2) . As h increases, the budget set rotates clockwise through the production point {
For regions with a very low h, the budget set is quite flat, becoming steeper as h rises. The rotation of the budget constraint as h varies illustrates the idiosyncratic risk that cannot be diversified away. Borrowing and lending in the interbank market allows the region to locate any where along the budget set, but the inability to insure against the liquidity shock implies the region cannot change the budget set.
The market-clearing conditions are
Definition 1 An interbank competitive equilibrium with private information and no regional financial markets is an allocation {x 1 (h, r), x 2 (h, r)}, investment portfolio {E − k, k}, and interest rate r such that (i) the financial intermediary maximizes (3) subject to the budget constraint (26) and individual incentive compatibility constraint (6) by choosing k (r) and the Green-Lin consumption allocation (27)-(28), for all h ∈ H; (iii) the interbank market clears, so (30)-(31) are satisified at r b .
The equilibrium interest rate r b is the solution to
The left side is strictly increasing in r. The second and third terms on the right side are decreasing in r. If h c (r) is small, specifically near h, the right side is decreasing in r so an equilibrium exists. 11 For logarithmic utility, h c (r) = h.
be an interbank competitive equilibrium (Definition 1).
The interbank competitive equilibrium does not support the first-best consumption allocation {c f 1 , c 2f }. The equilibrium interest rate satisfies
Proof.
. For any h = h m ,
concave. Using (28), it follows
which violates Assumption 3.
If an equilibrium exists, then it has the property βr ≥ 1, so the incentive compatibility constraint (6) is satisfied. An equilibrium exists if the relative curvature of the utility function is not too large or if there is sufficient demand for liquidity insurance, which is a property of the distribution of the liquidity demand shocks. The interest rate in the private information economy is different from the first-best rate, creating a pecuniary externality of the type described by Bhattacharya and Gale [4] . While the financial intermediary provides liquidity insurance, it relies on the interbank market to smooth liquidity demand shocks and the resulting competitive equilibrium is inefficient.
11 This is a joint restriction on h and the distribution function π. An economy in which h = 0 and a concentration of probability mass near low values of h may not have an equilibrium because there is insufficient demand for liquidity. In that case, the interest rate would be β −1 and there would be storage. This is partly a restriction on the probability density function π. The intuition is there must be enough of a demand for liquidity in the first period for an equilibrium to exist.
Logarithmic Utility
Define τ :
and observe τ (h) is decreasing and convex in h. 12 Equilibrium consumption satisfies hx 1 (h, r) = [1 − τ (h)]W (r) and (1 − h)x 2 (h, r) = τ (h)rW (r). The equilibrium interest rate is
and investment in the long-term project is k (r b ). It can be directly verified that r f − r b > 0.
Interbank and Financial Markets Co-Exist
By assumption, financial intermediaries and local financial markets co-exist. In Figure 1 , households now trade in local financial markets as well as placing deposits with the local financial intermediary. At t = 0 the household deposits E with the local financial intermediary offering the allocation C = {c 1 (υ, h), c 2 (υ, h)} providing the highest ex ante expected utility. At t = 1, each household observes υ and decides its announcementυ, which determines its consumption stream {c 1 (υ, h), c 2 (υ, h)}. The liabilities of the financial intermediary can be used either as collateral in borrowing or directly traded (as negotiable securities) in the local financial market at interest rate r(h). This opportunity to engage in trading in local financial markets impacts a household's incentive to reveal information.
Since υ is private information and consumption is unobservable, a household realizing υ may announcê υ = υ. At t = 1 , the household solves
where the announcementυ ∈ {0, 1} determines the discounted present value of the payments on deposits, the left side of (34). Let {x 1 (υ, C, r(h)),x 2 (υ, C, r(h)),υ(υ, C, r(h)) denote the solution to (33) subject to 12 Observe τ (h) = − β (β(1−h)+h) 2 < 0 and τ (h) = 2
(34). An impatient household announcingυ will consumê
at t = 1, while a patient household announcingυ will consumê
Since the indirect utility function V H (·) is increasing in wealth, where wealth is defined as the left side of (34), a household has an incentive to announce theυ maximizing wealth regardless of his realization υ. Specifically, if
then all households in the region will announce υ = 1, while the converse holds if the inequality is reversed.
Farhi, Golosov and Tsyvinski [9] demonstrate an incentive compatible allocation with private trading will have the property
for each h ∈ H, so the discounted present value of any incentive-compatible allocation is equal for all υ, conditional on h and given r.
The financial intermediary can borrow or lend the amount b in the local financial market at interest rate r(h), in addition to trading in the interbank market. Its budget constraints are
Solve (37) for A and substitute into (36) and rewrite
The financial intermediary maximizes the expected utility of the representative agent (3) subject to the constraint (38) and the incentive compatibility constraint with private trading
This constraint replaces the individual incentive compatibility constraint (6).
The financial intermediary will arbitrage between the local financial market and the interbank market:
if r(h) > r ( r(h) < r) then it borrows (lends) the amount A in the interbank market and lends (borrows) the amount b in the local financial market until the no arbitrage condition
is satisfied.
The financial intermediary chooses a portfolio allocation maximizing W (k, r), where the solution is W (r).
The elimination of arbitrage profits and competition among local financial intermediaries in a region will result in zero profits so the left side of (38) can be expressed as
Assuming (40) holds and profits are zero, it follows from (38) that
where W h is defined in (35).
The solution to the financial intermediary's problem is (i) a portfolio allocation {E −k (r), θ(k (r)) α }, (ii) interbank position A(h, r, ), and (iii) local credit market position b(h) such that the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied, and a consumption allocation c 1 (υ, r), c 2 (υ, r) satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint with private trading (??) such that, given the interest rate r and consumption allocation, households truthfully reveal their typesυ = υ.
The assets of the financial intermediary at t = 1 equal W (r) plus lending in the interbank market (if A(h) > 0) or lending in the local financial market (b > 0). The liabilities equal the present value of the claims on the intermediary, which include borrowing in either the interbank market or the local financial market in addition to the present value of claims W H (h, r). The maturity structure between liabilities at t = 1 and t = 2 is indeterminate. For convenience, set c 1 (υ, h) = E − k (r) and c 2 (υ, h) = θ(k (r)) α . This arrangement satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint with private trading. The financial arrangement between households and the local financial intermediary is discussed briefly below.
Equilibrium in Financial Markets
In a region realizing h, a fraction h of the regional households wish to borrow (or sell) their claims against the long term asset. A fraction 1 − h are willing to lend. When the position taken by the financial intermediary is b = 0, the equilibrium interest rate r(h) in the local credit market is
creating a distribution of interest rates across regions. 13 The local financial intermediary will arbitrage across the interbank market and local financial market, setting A as
If r(h) > r, then b > 0 and A < 0 because the financial intermediary borrows in the interbank market where interest rates are lower. When r(h) < r the financial intermediary borrows in local markets and lends in the interbank market.
Impatient households consume W (r) and patient households consume rW (r). The equilibrium condition in the interbank market is an interest rate r m (k) solving
given k. The equilibrium interbank interest rate is
given k.
Definition 2 An financial market competitive equilibrium is a consumption allocation {c m1 , c m2 }, a portfolio {E − k m , k m }, and interest rates r and r(h) for h ∈ H such that (i) Households solve (33) subject to 13 If households buy and sell claims on the intermediary, the price q(h) in equilibrium satisfies
(34) given r(h); (ii) The financial intermediary solves (3) subject to (38) and (39) given r, r(h);(iii) The no arbitrage condition (40) is satisfied; (iv) The interbank equilibrium condition (42) is satisfied at r m (v) The local financial market is in equilibrium (satisfies (41).
The financial intermediary anticipates this rate of interest at t = 0 when making its portfolio allocation (E − k, k). Substitute r = θαk α−1 into (43) and solve for k
This is the optimal investment in the long-term asset when financial and interbank markets co-exist. The choice of k and the market interest rate r m = r m (k m ) do not depend on the curvature of the utility function or β. In equilibrium,
The financial intermediary borrows
where the interest rate r m is substituted. (1)- (4), βr m ≥ 1 and r m < r f , from which it follows k m > k f .
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions

Proof.
To show βr m ≥ 1, substitute for k m using (44) in the definition of r m (k) in (43)
Rewriting, it follows
where the last inequalityuses Assumption 4.
To prove r m (k m ) < r f , define the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution as
and observe R(k) is increasing in k, as is r m . For a given k, observe
By assumption U (c)c is decreasing and the allocation satisfies the individual incentive compatibility con- Hence financial markets result in lower interest rates with a higher fraction of the endowment invested in the long-term asset, or equivalently a lower investment in the short-term asset, relative to the first-best
allocation. An important property of this allocation is
and c m1 = cm2 rm . Hence no liquidity insurance is provided when agents directly trade in financial markets, a point recognized by Jacklin [13] among others. Since the financial intermediary eliminates arbitrage profits, r = r(h) and the household's consumption is unaffected by the realization h.
Financial Arrangement Between Households and Intermediaries
The deposit contract offered by the financial intermediary {c 1 (υ, h), c 2 (υ, h)} is assumed to be tradable in the local credit market. It is also assumed the household deposits its entire endowment with the financial intermediary because storage between periods 0 and 1 is ruled out. Maintaining this assumption doesn't preclude other financial arrangements between households and the financial intermediary, as long at the t = 1 present value of the allocation to each household, regardless of its announcement of type, is equal to W (r) and the no arbitrage condition is satisfied.
As an example following Jacklin, the financial intermediary can be organized as a mutual fund with complete financing by equity capital. At t = 0, each household deposits its endowment with the financial intermediary in exchange for an equity share, which is a claim to a two-period dividend stream (E − k, θk α )
when the mutual fund invests k in the long-term asset. At t = 1, each household receives the dividend E − k and observes its υ. Impatient households wish to sell their ex-dividend share while patient households wish to buy shares. There is an active secondary market trading ex-dividend shares. Households selling shares at t = 1 receive (1 − h)(E − k) at t = 1 in exchange for hθk α at t = 2. In the event equity shares are traded only within a region, the share price would be q(h) = θk α rm(h) and there would be an arbitrage opportunity across regions. When the equity markets are integrated across regions, the ex-dividend share price in the secondary market is q = θk α rm . All shares trade at the same price because the dividend stream is identical across regions. Trading equity shares in an integrated market will result in an allocation such that c2 r = c 1 .
Central Bank Policy
In the absence of intervention by the central bank, the two trading mechanisms -financial intermediation only versus co-existence with financial markets -result in different equilibrium allocations, and neither results in the first-best allocation. The central bank may be able to implement welfare-improving policies by acting as a mechanism designer. Bhattacharya and Gale derive the second-best (incentive-efficient) allocation in a framework similar to the one studied here. In their model, the central bank is a mechanism designer implementing incentive-compatible transfers across regions. The key difference between their approach and mine is the lack of financial markets in Bhattacharya and Gale, whereas the impact of subsequent trading opportunities for both financial intermediaries and households is the focus here.
The potential to trade impacts the social planning problem in several ways. The central bank chooses a feasible allocation {E − k, k} at t = 0 and consumption allocation S ≡ {c 1 (υ, h), c 2 (υ, h)} h∈H,υ∈{0,1} . If the consumption allocation requires transfers of the consumption good across regions, incentives of a region to reveal information are typically affected. A region announcing it is a typeĥ will receiveĥc 1 (0,ĥ) + (1 − h)c 1 (1,ĥ) at t = 1 andĥc 2 (0,ĥ) + (1 −ĥ)c 2 (1,ĥ) at t = 2 from the central bank. By assumption, the central bank cannot prevent borrowing and lending in the interbank market, nor can it make the transfers contingent on subsequent activity in the interbank market. A regional financial intermediary realizing h and announcingĥ to the central bank will choose an allocation {z 1 (υ, h), z 2 (υ, h)}, υ ∈ {0, 1} subject to its budget constraintsĥ
where borrowing in the interbank and local financial markets is incorporated. Solve (48) for A, substitute into (48), and rewrite to obtain
The financial intermediary chooses {ĥ,
subject to (49) and the individual incentive compatibility constraint with trading
where V H is defined as the indirect utility of a household, or the solution to
This value function V F (S, r, h, r(h)) is increasing in the present value of the transfers from the social planner, equal to the first term in brackets on the left side of (49). The second term on the left side is arbitrage profits, which equal zero in equilibrium.
Although the model differs in several key ways, the arguments developed by FGT can be applied here.
The financial intermediary will announce theĥ maximizing the present value of the transfers from the central bank, or
The regional incentive compatibility constraint with interbank markets is
must hold for each h, where c 1 (1, h) = c 2 (0, h) = 0 for convenience.
Households in a region realizing h take the allocation offered by the financial intermediary as given and trade in the local financial markets at interest rate r(h). Financial intermediaries take the allocation offered by the central bank as given and engage in trading in the interbank market at interest rate r. The central bank takes the existence of the subsequent trading opportunities into account in solving its maximization problem. The social planning problem with interbank and local financial markets is stated next.
(SP3) The central bank chooses a portfolio (E−k, k)} and a feasible consumption allocation {c 1 (υ, h), c 2 (υ, h)}, h ∈ H and υ ∈ {0, 1} to maximize the expected utility of a representative household (3) subject to the resource constraints (1) and (2), and the regional incentive compatibility constraint (53), where the function V F incorporates the individual incentive compatibility constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint with private trading, and (r, r(h)) are the equilibrium interest rates.
Definition 3
The constrained efficient allocation with interbank and local financial markets is a feasible allocation {E − k, k, {c 1 (υ, h), c 2 (υ, h)} h∈H,υ∈{0,1} } solving the central bank's problem (SP3), where the noarbitrage condition holds, and the interbank market and local financial markets are in equilibrium.
FGT discuss the solution in a model with an exogenous return to the long-term project and without liquidity demand shocks (so h = h m ). They demonstrate the social planner can achieve an allocation superior to the one achieved by competitive markets, even in the presence of private-trading opportunities for households and financial intermediaries. FGT demonstrate the constrained efficient allocation with private trading coincides with the full information allocation. The allocation can be implemented through a liquidity floor, which takes the form of a simple portfolio restriction.
Although there is an additional source of uncertainty and trading (interbank market) in this model, the mathematical structure here is very similar to their structure. Instead of formally proving the existence of a solution and determining the properties of this solution, as FGT do, I examine whether the first-best allocation can be implemented using a simple policy, specifically a liquidity floor, as in Allen and Gale [2] and FGT. By construction, if the first-best allocation satisfies all of the constraints when the liquidity floor is in place, then it is the constrained efficient solution when there in private information and co-existence of local and interbank financial markets. A formal proof can be constructed based on the proof of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 in FGT.
The steps are to examine if the two incentive compatibility constraints and resource constraints are satisfied under the conjecture there is a liquidity floor. The first step is to examine the impact of local financial markets on the incentive compatibility constraint faced by the financial intermediary, specifically the t = 1 discounted present value of claims on the financial intermediary must be equal for any υ ∈ {0, 1}.
This property and equilibrium in the local market, implies
Second, the menu of feasible allocations C = {c 1 (υ, h), c 2 (υ, h)} chosen by the social planner will have the property the t = 1 discounted present value of transfers to a financial intermediary will be equal across for
to satisfy the regional incentive compatibility constraint with trading ((??).
The question is whether there is an intervention in the form of a liquidity floor implementing the constrained efficient allocation with interbank trading and financial trading. Suppose the central bank imposes a liquidity floor on financial intermediaries, specifically the portfolio allocation to short term assets must satisfy
This is a restriction on the composition of assets on the intermediary's balance sheet. If the constraint is binding, then k = E − M . For the constraint to be ginding, the interest rate in the interbank market must satisfy r < r f , otherwise k (r) > E − M . The social planner offers an allocation {E − k f , θk α f } to each region regardless of its announcementĥ, which satisfies the regional incentive compatibility constraint with interbank markets (53). At t = 0, the financial intermediary chooses k subject to the liquidity constraint, so k = k f . In this case, the equilibrium interest rate in the interbank market is
As derived earlier, consumption of impatient households will satisfy 
Conclusion
Private information plays an important role in financial arrangements and pricing. The assumption contractual arrangements cannot be made exclusive leads to private trading, altering the incentives to reveal information. The question addressed here is how private information and private trading interact to impact a regional bank's investment portfolio, securitization of that portfolio, and the ability to smooth liquidity shocks in the interbank market.
A regional bank observes a random variable determining the distribution of its risky investments. It also observes a random variable determining the fraction of households in its region wishing for early consumption.
The interaction of private information and private trading creates an incentive for all regions to act as if they are low risk in the securitization process, resulting in an over-investment in the risky asset by high risk regions and an over-investment in the safe asset by low risk regions. This distortion in the composition of assets impacts the region's ability to smooth liquidity shocks. As in FGT, the private-trading constrained efficient allocation can be implemented by imposing a liquidity floor, a restriction on the composition of the investment portfolio, which impacts the equilibrium interest rate in the interbank market.   which determines the liquidity demand shock at which a lending region increases its first-period consumption in response to an increase in r. Observe h c (r) < h b (r). For regions with h < h c (r), x 1 (h, r) is increasing in r. For regions with h ≥ h c , x 1 (h, r) is decreasing in r.
